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SERVICE OF PROCESS IN SUITS AGAINST
DIRECTORS: A BARRIER TO JUSTICE
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE
FRANK TAYLOR COTTER
Today an unwarranted situation exists in that directors of a corporation
by a careful selection of states of domicile separate and distinct from the
state of incorporation and each other may emasculate the right of their
corporation, its stockholders, or their fellow directors to call them to account
for their wrongdoings. This is true whether the suit be brought in the state
courts or in the federal courts. That such a situation demands a remedy
brooks no discussion. The questions are: "What remedy?" and "By whom ?"
An examination of the situation and the factors that bring it about should
prove helpful in determining the answers.
For example, where the X corporation having ten directors is incorporated
in New York, one of its directors must be a resident of New York, but
the other nine directors may be residents of any number of other states.
When the corporation, due to limitations on the service of process, is forced
to bring a suit against the resident director alone, it may well be that he
is not financially able to pay the judgment it obtains. In this event the
corporation is under the necessity of instituting suits against the other di-
rectors in their respective states. Considerable hardship and expense is
thus placed upon the corporation by its own directors.' Likewise, it is
unfair that the New York director should be subjected to the burden of
defending such a suit alone. In the event that judgment goes against him
and he is innocent of personal wrongdoing, he must seek his reimbursement
by multiple suits in distant jurisdictions.2 On the other hand where he is a
joint tortfeasor and resident in a state which unlike New York permits
contribution, he is unable to take advantage of his substantive right but
must also start multiple suits elsewhere. And equally important, this situ-
ation is an imposition upon the several courts to which resort is had. The
'When a stockholder sues, the situation is even worse. All that a director need do
to escape any suit at all in the state courts is to reside in a state where the corporation
cannot be served with process. There a motion to dismiss will, in almost every state,
be granted because the corporation is an indispensable party defendant. I Consult the
Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission of the State of New York with
reference to this problem and the study of Walter Pond, Esq., in support thereof, pre-
pared under the direction of Professor John W. MacDonald, Executive Secretary and
Director of Research. Report of Law Revision Commission for 1941, N. Y. Leg. Doc.
(1941) No. 65 (I). And see Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1261.2Bohlen, Contributions ad Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 CORNELL L.
Q. 552, (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 469 and Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F. (2d)
218 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
PROCESS IN SUITS AGAINST DIRECTORS
expense of the conduct of such suits properly rests upon the court of the
state in which the corporation is organized. It is, therefore, clearly desir-
able that some provision should be made for suit against corporate directors
in the state or federal courts of the state in which the corporation is organ-
ized in order that all the directors may be made defendants in one court
and that court enabled to make a final disposition of the litigation.
If this be so desirable, one may well inquire why it is not possible to
bring such a suit today in the state or federal courts. The difficulty in the
state courts is that process cannot be served beyond the state lines and
the difficulty in the federal courts of the state of the corporation's domicile
is the same. There is, however, this difference between the two. Under
Pennoyer v. Neff,' there is a question of the constitutionality of the power
of the state to permit the service of its process upon non-residents when
they are without the state, while in the case of the federal courts there is
no constitutional objection to the service of process any place in the United
States. 4
If we say that the remedy is to be furnished by the state, then the ideal
solution is for each state to pass a statute providing that as a condition for
taking office the director automatically designates the Secretary of State as
his agent for the service of process. This agency should be limited to
actions involving his relationship to the corporation, where the suit is brought
against him by the corporation, a stockholder, trustee in bankruptcy, or
receiver in the right of the corporation.
Such a statute finds its constitutional basis in the conditional theory sug-
gested approvingly and farsightedly by Stephen Field in Pennoyer v. Neff,
where he said:
"To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion,
it is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by anything we
have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the
status of one of its citizens toward a non-resident, which would be bind-
ing within the State, though made without service of process or per-
sonal notice to the non-resident. ...
"Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representa-
tive in the State to receive service of process and notice in legal pro-
ceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association, or
contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be made and
notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment
or to designate such place that service may be made upon a public officer
395 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
4268 U. S. 619, 45 Sup. Ct. 621 (1924).
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designated for that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that
judgments rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the
non-residents both within and without the State .... Nor do we doubt
that a State, on creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary
or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in which their conduct may
be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked,
.which shall require other than personal service upon their officers or
members. Parties becoming members of such corporations or institur-
tions would hold their interest subject to the conditions prescribed by
law."5
Mr. Justice Field's suggestion has been adopted by the various states in
enacting statutes conditioning the entry of foreign corporations, non-resi-
dent motorists, and individual citizens of other states for the purpose of
doing business in the state by agent. And such statutes have been held
constitutional, 6 provided that, in addition to service upon the designated
agent, the statute requires that adequate notice of the pendency of the action
be given the defendant and that he be given a reasonable opportunity to put
in a defense.7 In view of these authorities it does not appear likely that
the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional a state statute which
provided that by becoming a director in one of the corporations of the state
an individual thereby designates the secretary of state as his agent for the
service of process in actions against him involving his relationship with
the corporation.8
But constitutionality is not the only consideration. There are a number
of reasons why a state may not wish to pioneer with such a statute.
595 U. S. 714, 734-6, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877) (italics added).6Bagdon v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company, 217 N. Y. 432, 111
N. E. 1075 (1916), recently discussed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (1939) ; Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1926) ; Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553 (1934). Consult also, the Recommendation of the Law
Revision Commission of the State of New York in respect of service on non-resident
natural persons who do business in the state by agent (C. P. A. § 229b) and the sup-
porting study. Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1940, Leg. Doc. (1940) No.
65 (D) 105; and see'Note on Section 229b infra at page 119.7Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927).
SJudging by its most recent decision, the Supreme Court of the United States, is
prepared to tackle procedural problems courageously and decide them on the basis of
what is most desirable under modern conditions and quite independently of outmoded
rules of law. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct.
153 (1939); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59, 58 Sup. Ct. 454 (1937); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (1940), (1941) 26 CORNEL L. Q. 317. In this last
case Mr. Justice Stone declared, "With proper regard for divergent local institutions and
interests ... this Court is justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process
only in those cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it." 311 U. S. 32
at 42 (1940).
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In the first place it can be argued that the present situation permits direc-
tors some escape from the dreaded strike suit.9 The obvious answer is that
two wrongs do not make a right. Furthermore, there is no telling that a
suit is a strike suit until the court has heard the case on its merits. Cer-
tainly not every suit by a corporation or a stockholder, trustee in bankruptcy,
or receiver in the right of the corporation, can be called a strike suit. And,
as we have seen, the present law places an unfair burden upon the particular
director sued. Is a suit by such a director against his fellow directors for
reimbursement a strike suit?
Second, it can be contended that such a statute would chill the sale of
corporate charters by the state. The only reply we can make to this argu-
ment is that a state should be more interested in protecting its citizens from
wrong than in collecting revenue. This is doubtless true in a large state
such as New York. But a small state such as Delaware is less likely to be
persuaded to legislative action when a large part of its income is derived
from the sale of corporate charters and but a small part from the taxation
of foreign corporations doing business there.
Last, it can be pointed out that where a state pioneers with this legislation,
foreign stockholders and creditors of its corporations will be able to obtain
relief in its courts whereas its own citizens, as stockholders or creditors of
foreign corporations, will not be able to obtain reciprocal relief in the courts
of a foreign state. Looking at the matter broadly we can only deplore this
objection as selfish and provincial. Looking at it narrowly from the point
of view of an individual state we can sympathize. Our federal system in-
evitably causes states to be reluctant to pass beneficial legislation when other
states do not.
Whatever may be our views as to the theoretical soundness of either the
second or last objections, as a practical matter they are bound to be so
appealing to a state legislature as to insure the defeat of our suggested stat-
ute. And thus, since states have failed to act in this situation and since
there is little likelihood that left to themselves they will do so, it becomes
the obligation of the national government to remedy the difficulty.
There is no question about the power of Congress to provide that in an
action against individual defendants in a particular federal district court
9 1n the federal courts Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offers protection
against strike suits and a great many states require that stockholders' suits in their
courts meet the same requirements. In addition many proposals have been made to
substitute a different procedure entirely for the stockholders' suit. Consider especially,
Washington, Stockholders Derivative Suits: The Company's Role and a Suggestion(1940) 25 CORNEL L. Q. 361. For a complete collection of similar proposals and an
excellent analysis see the forthcoming study of stockholders' suits by the Law Revision
Commission, N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (I).
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that court's process may be served any place in the United States. As Mr.
Justice Brandeis said in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board:
"Cohgress has pover ... to provide that the process of every district
court shall run into every part of the United States. Toland v. Sprague,
12 Pat. 300, 328; United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 98 U. S.
569, 604."10
Without doubt the general rule is that service of process in the federal
court is confined to the district. To quote again from Mr. Justice Brandeis
in the Robertson case:
"In a civil suit in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, as dis-
tinguished from venue, implies, among other things, either voluntary
appearance by him or service of process upon him at a place where the
officer serving it has authority to execute a writ of summons. Under
the general provisions of law, a United States district court cannot issue
process beyond the limits of the district, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S.
476; Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash. 456; and a defendant in a civil suit
can be subjected to its jurisdiction in personam only by service within
the district. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 330. Such was the general
rule established by the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, §. 11,
1 Stat. 73, 79, in accordance with the practice at the common law.
Piquet v. Swan, 5 Mason, 35, 39 et seq. And such has been the general
rule ever since.""1
But it is to be observed that the limitation of service of process to the
districts has not been a question of power but of policy. Whenever Congress
has felt that there was good reason to permit the service of process else-
where it has by special enactment done so. Three outstanding examples
of the exercise of this power of Congress are the Interpleader Act,' 2 the
Securities and Exchange Act,' 3 and the 1936 amendment to the federal
venue statute.' 4 And in addition to these statutes there are many others.' 5
Under the powers conferred upon it by the enabling act of June 19, 1934,16
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Rule 4 (f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, provided:
"All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and,
10268 U. S. 619, 622, 45 Sup. Ct. 621 (1924).
1268 U. S. at 622-3.
1249 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1940).
1348 STAT. 86, § 22 (a) (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 (v) (a) (1941) and 48 STAT. 84,
pendence Shares Corporation, 311 U. S. 282, 61 Sup. Ct. 229 (1940) ; Cohen v. Saddle-
§ 12 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77 (1) (1941) ; and see in this connection Deckert v. Inde-
mire, 26 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1939).
1449 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (Supp. 1940).
15 Consult the Commentary, 5 FED. RULES Samv. 4 F. 22, for a complete collection.
1648 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §9 723 (b), 723 (c).
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when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial
limits of that state."
-and this despite the fact that the Advisory Committee in a preliminary
draft called the attention of the court to the fact that "Some members of
the bar question the power of the court to make this extension." 17 Before
the rules took effect they had to be reported to Congress. But when this
was done no change in the provisions of Rule 4 (f) was made by that body.
This fact was influential in causing the majority of the court to sustain,
against attack, Rule 35 in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,'8 and may well cause
the court to sustain 4 (f). On the other hand certain lower courts have held
4 (f) to be beyond the power of the Supreme Court under the enabling
act and its fate remains to be seen.19
Assuming that the Supreme Court's power to promulgate Rule 4 (f) was
under the enabling act a matter of "practice and procedure" and thus valid,
as we think it is, there seems nothing to prevent the Court's amending
Rule 4 (f) so as to permit the service of process in suits against directors
any place in the United States. 20 That such an amendment would have to
be reported to Congress is required by the terms of the enabling act, but
this could readily be done if the Court would promulgate an amended rule.
It is doubtful, however, whether the Court could be persuaded to make
such a limited change. The wisdom of its doing so is questionable. This
is particularly true in view of the fact that its power to promulgate 4 (f)
17 (April, 1937) Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, 14.18312 U. S. 1, 61 Sup. Ct. 422 (1941).
19Williams v. James, 34 F. Supp. 61 (W. D. La. 1940) where the cases both ways
are cited and discussed.
20The enabling act (Sections 723 (b) and 723 (c) of Title 28 U. S. C.) says "the Su-
preme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for
the district courts of the United States and the courts of the District of Columbia, the
forms of process . . . in civil actions at law." It also provides that, "The court may
at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases -in equity with those in
actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both. .. ."
Nowhere in the enabling act is there an express provision giving the court the power
of amendment. Such power must be implicit in the power given to the court by Con-
gress to promulgate the rules in the first place. However, Gustavus Ohlinger, Esq.,
makes an able argument to the effect that the "clearest authorization" must be given
by Congress to the Supreme Court, "as the present rules have the effect of law even
to the extent of superseding inconsistent statutes" and since "such clear authorization
is lacking in the Enabling Act," the court is without power to amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or promulgate new ones. Ohlinger, Problems of Jurisdiction
and Venue (1940) 26 C0RN.LL L. Q. 240. The Advisory Committee was of a different
view. See (1938) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the American
Bar Association Institute, 179. Its view seems to have prevailed because, with Mr.
Justice Black dissenting, the Court on December 28, 1939, amended Rule 81 (a) (6) of
the Rules. See 3 MooRns FEDERA. PRAcT cICE (2 yr. Supp. 1940) 157 and compare 59
Sup. Ct. clxxv and 1 MooRE's FEaDERA PRAcricE (2 yr. Supp. 1940) 13, 14. In amend-
ing 81 (a) (6) the method of the enabling act was used and the amendment reported
to the Congress.
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was questioned at the time and is still being questioned. Therefore, the
wiser course to pursue would seem to be to appeal directly to Congress for
legislation.
This legislation should take the form of an amendment to Section 112 of
Title 28, the federal venue statute, so as to permit all of the directors of a
corporation to be sued together in a federal court in the state of the corpo-
ration's domicile. It should be provided further that in such an action
process may be served any place in the United States or its territories. If
possible, provision should be made for service upon its directors who are
non-residents of the United States.2'
We have suggested that the proposed statute permit a corporation to sue
all of its directors in the United States district court in the state of the
corporation's domicile. This suggestion is deliberately made, mindful of
the rule of Strawbridge v. Cirtiss.22 Inevitably that rule will be violated
here since by statute many of the states require that there be at least one
resident director. His citizenship and that of the corporation will be the
same and complete diversity will be lacking. But that this apparent viola-
tion has precedent can be seen in the interpleader act which has been framed
on the theory that under Article III of the Constitution complete diversity
is not necessary and that Strawbridge v. Curtiss is distinguishable because
decided under the Judiciary Act of Congress. If this provision of the
interpleader act be upheld, there is every reason that a similar provision
may be made here.
Recently, the Supreme Court of its own motion in Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co.23 raised the question of its jurisdiction under the interpleader
act. Although in that case there was complete diversity and jurisdiction
was sustained, Mr. Justice Reed significantly said:
"Before considering the questions raised by the petition for certiorari,
the jurisdiction of the federal court under the Act of January 20, 1936,
must be determined. As this issue affects the jurisdiction of this Court,
it is raised on its own motion. By the Act of January 20, 1936, the
district courts have jurisdiction of suits in equity, interpleading two or
more adverse claimants, instituted by complainants who have property
of the requisite value claimed by citizens of different states.
"The suit may be maintained 'although the titles or claims of the con-
flicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical,
but are adverse to and independent of the other'. Process may run at
least throughout all the states.
21Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 52 Sup. Ct. 252 (1931); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 Sup.
Ct. 339 (1941).
223 Cranch 267, 2 L. ed. 434 (1806).
23308 U. S. 66, 60 Sup. Ct. 44 (1939).
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"As required by the Act this case was begun by the complainant, a
corporation of the State of Washington, impleading one group of claim-
ants who are citizens of that same state and another, the adverse group,
who are citizens of Idaho. Under the Interpleader Act, this identity of
citizenship is permissible since diversity only between claimants is re-
quired. The Interpleader Act is based upon the clause of § 2, Article
III, of the Constitution which extends the judicial power of the United -
States to controversies 'between citizens of different states.' Is this
grant of jurisdiction broad enough to cover the present situation?
"The Judicial Code, § 24, provides for original jurisdiction of suits
of a civil nature between citizens of different states in precisely the
language of the Constitution. The present wording is practically the
same as that of the Act of March 3, 1875, 'the circuit courts ...shall
have original cognizance ...of all suits ...in which there shall be a
controversy between citizens of different states' and that of the original
Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 'the suit is between a citizen of
the state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state.'
Without ruling as to possible limitations of the constitutional grant, it
is held by this Court that the statutory language of the respective judi-
ciary acts forbids suits in the federal courts unless all the parties on
one side are of citizenship diverse to those of the other side. For the
determination of the validity of the Interpleader Act we need not de-
cide whether the words of the Constitution, 'Controversies . . .between
Citizens of different States', have a different meaning from that given
by judicial construction to similar words in the Judiciary Act. Even
though the constitutional language limits the judicial power to contro-
versies wholly between citizens of different states, that requirement is
satisfied here."'2
4
Since there is such a genuine need for an efficient interpleader procedure
there is every reason to suppose that when the court meets the point, it will
uphold the jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain bills of interpleader
even though complete diversity be lacking. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., in a
recent article states that jurisdiction may be upheld "in spite of the partial
cocitizenship" if the court wishes to do so. He says:
"The broad ground is tenable, that complete diversity of citizenship
is not required by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution: 'The
judicial Power shall extend ...to Controversies ... between Citizens
of different States.' This clause may be satisfied when there is a genuine
controversy between two claimants who reside in different states, even
though the litigation also involves another controversy between the
stakeholder and the cocitizen claimant. Although in many cases not
involving interpleader the Supreme Court has denied jurisdiction unless
all the parties on one side live in different states from all those on the
other side. The Court drew this requirement of complete diversity of
24308 U. S. 66 at 70-72, 60 Sup. Ct. 44 (1939).
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citizenship from the language of the statutes and not from the Consti-
tution. These cases merely held that Congress had not as yet permitted
federal suits where there was a partial cocitizenship. They did not hold
that Congress could not constitutionally permit such suits if it wished,
for example, by the Interpleader Acts.
"The objection may be urged that the wording of the statutes under
which the Supreme Court has required complete diversity of citizenship
is exactly the same as the wording of Article III, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution. If these words in the statute demand complete diversity of
citizenship, do not they also demand it when they occur in the Constitu-
tion? The best reply to this objection is, that constitutional language
may properly be given a wider interpretation than statutory language.
Since the Constitution has a broader purpose than a statute and is in-
tended to last for a much longer time, its wording should possess a
flexibility which is not needed in a statute. Such is the view of Mr.
Justice Holmes:
"'But it is not necessarily true that income means the same thing
in the Constitution and the act. A word is not a crystal, trans-
parent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used.'
"An additional argument for the position that partial cocitizenship
is permitted by the Constitution is found in the fact that the Supreme
Court has frequently sanctioned it in federal litigation under the judge-
made doctrines of separable controversy and the ancillary jurisdiction.
If in these complex cases where one suit includes several controversies
and where justice and convenience require that the presence of two
parties from the same state in one of the controversies shall not pre-
vent the settlement of the entire litigation, the United States courts are
enabled to go ahead through judicial law-making, why can they not also
receive the same power to promote convenience and justice in inter-
pleader cases from Congressional legislation? Partial cocitizenship
ought to be just as constitutional under a statute as under a doctrine de-
dared by court." 25
The statute should be so drawn, however, that if this provision be held un-
constitutional it will not affect the constitutionality of the balance of the
statute.
Even if such a provision as above suggested, destroying the rule requir-
ing complete diversity, were declared unconstitutional, the non-resident de-
fendant directors might be able to interplead the resident directors as third
party defendants under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which permits such interpleader by defendant when the person not a party
to the action "is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him." Under the wording of' Rule 14 this
25 Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936 (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 377, 395-6.
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can be done even in a state such as New York, which does not permit con-
tribution between joint tortfeasors even though the third party defendant
be of the same citizenship as the plaintiff.26 However, despite the wording
of Rule 14, it has been held by Judge Chestnut in Malkin v. Arundel
Corp.27 that a joint tortfeasor may not be interpleaded unless the plain-
tiff amends his complaint to ask relief against the proposed third party
defendant. This holding has been predicated not only on the wording of
Rule 14 which says, "The plaintiff may amend his pleadings" but also upon
the proposition that to permit this to be done would violate the substantive
law. Commenting upon the point James A. Pike and Henry G. Fischer say:
"It is clear, of course, that the right to contribution is a substantive
right and that Rule 14 cannot, under the limitations of the ,Enabling
Act and the rule of Erie Co. v. Tompkins, operate to extend it.. Conse-
quently, it has been held that under a statute whereby a defendant has
a right to contribution only as against those whom plaintiff chooses to
join as codefendants, an illegal tort-feasor cannot be brought in a third-
part defendant, solely on the basis of a possible liability of contribu-
tion, unless plaintiff amends his complaint to claim relief against the
new party. This interpretation seems correct, since if defendant were
allowed to bring in the third party against the will of the plaintiff, he
would be extending his substantive rights in a manner not permissible in
the state courts.' 28
But to the writers this seems to be wrong. The bringing in of a party
defendant is a procedural matter. It does not directly affect the substantive
rights, though it does indirectly do so. There is no substantive law right
preventing the several "defendants from being sued together since it is
merely the right of the plaintiff at his option to sue one or more tortfeasors.
Thus if the federal court acting under the authority of Rule 14 permits a
defendant to bring in a co-tortfeasor as an additional party defendant, it
would seem that this would not be a violation of Erie v. Tompkins20 unless
the substantive law of the state denied that the proposed third party de-
fendant was liable to the plaintiff.
It may be said on behalf of this legislation that it is likely to decrease
26Holtzoff, Some Problems 'Under Federal Third-Party Practice (1941) 3 LA. L.
Rv. 408.
2736 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941). The Maryland law as to contributions among
joint tortfeasors appears to be the same as New York. It is interesting to note in con-
nection with the New York law of contribution the case of Haines v. Bero Engineering
Construction Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th Dep't 1930), decided
by Judge Crouch and cited approvingly in Fox v. Western N. Y. Motors Lines, Inc.,
232 App. Div. 308, 249 N. Y. Supp. 643 (4th Dep't 1931), reversed, 257 N. Y. 305, 178
N. E. 289 (1931).284 FED. RULES Suav. 900 at 901.
29304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
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rather than increase suits of this kind in the federal courts. At present
several different suits must be brought. To bring most of them the corpo-
ration must leave the state of its domicile. Under the proposed statute
only one suit need be instituted. However, bearing in mind the warning
that Mr. Justice Frankfurter has voiced3 ° against the extension of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to purely state matters, such a statute
could provide that it would not be operative when the state of the corpo-
ration's domicile enacts a statute under which suit against all directors may
be maintained in the courts.
In 1936 Section 11231 was amended so as to provide:
"Suit by a stockholder on behalf of a corporation may be brought in
any district in which suit against the defendant or defendants in said
stockholders' action, other than said corporation, might have been
brought by such corporation and process in such cases may be served
upon the corporation in any district wherein such corporation resides or
may be found. '3 2
The House Committee on Judiciary, in favorably reporting this amend-
ment, thus expressed its purpose:
"Its purpose is to plug a loophole in judicial procedure through which
holding companies and parent organizations are enabled to strip a sub-
sidiary corporation of all its assets to the loss of minority stockholders
of the subsidiary corporation without possibility of being brought to
account in any court, either Federal or State. '33
When we examine this bill together with the report of the House Com-
mittee on Judiciary three tacit propositions are immediately discernable. In
promulgating this bill Congress gave cognizance to: (1) the tremendous
importance of the corporate form to the economic life of this country and
therefore, necessarily, the proportional importance of preventing any abuse
of that method of doing business; (2) the possibility that in some instances,
due either to imperfections of legal and governmental systems or to practical
considerations beyond their control, the separate states are unable to either
correct or cope with these abuses; (3) the duty of the national government
3OFrankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the State and Federal Courts
(1928) 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499. In connection with this article it is interesting to note
the following quotation from Justice Frankfurter in 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4007, 4009 (U. S.
1941) where he says: "The dominant note in the successive enactments of Congress
relating to diversity jurisdiction is one of jealous restriction, of avoiding offence to
State sensitiveness, and of relieving the federal courts of the overwhelming burden of
'business that intrinsically belongs to the state courts' in order to keep them free for
their distinctive federal business."
3149 STAT. 1213 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 112 (Supp. 1940).32Amendment of April 16, 1936, c. 230, 49 STAT. 1213.33H. R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
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in such cases to step in and fulfill its obligations as a federal government
by exercising its power, territorially broader than any state power, to remedy
the problem of its helpless members. To show that these three propositions
exist also where service of process is attempted today on cleverly located
wrongdoing directors has been the purpose of this article. 'Congressional
legislation is required!
